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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 880102 
v. : 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, : Priority No. 1 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an answer to a petition for rehearing in an 
appeal from a conviction of Murder in the First Degree, a capital 
felony, after a jury verdict imposing a sentence of death in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the reasonable doubt jury instruction given 
in the penalty phase did not constitute manifest error in light 
of this Court's ruling in Tillman that an identical instruction 
did not violate due process? 
2. Whether no manifest error or prejudice occurred in 
the present case due to the alleged failure of the Iron County 
Attorney to file a civil bond statutorily required for his 
political office? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (1987 replacement). 
17-16-11. Official bonds. 
The board of county commissioners shall 
prescribe by ordinance the amount in which 
the following county and precinct officers 
shall execute official bonds before entering 
upon the discharge of the duties of their 
respective offices, viz.: county clerk, 
county auditor, sheriff, county attorney, 
county recorder, county assessor, county 
surveyor, justice of the peace and constable, 
and the board may by ordinance require any 
deputy or assistant of any such officer to 
execute an official bond before entering upon 
the discharge of the duties of his office. 
The amount in which the county treasurer 
shall execute an official bond shall be 
prescribed by the state money management 
council. If surety company bonds are taken, 
the premium for such bonds as the county 
commissioners shall specify by ordinance 
shall be paid out of the county funds. The 
judge or judges of the district court of the 
county shall prescribe the amount in which 
each member of the board of county 
commissioners of the county shall execute an 
official bond before entering upon the 
discharge of the duties of his office. If 
surety company bonds are taken and if the 
county commissioners shall so direct by 
ordinance the premium for each such bond 
shall be paid out of the county funds. The 
bonds and sureties of county commissioners 
must, before the bonds can be recorded and 
filed, be approved by one of said judges. 
The bonds and sureties of all other county 
and precinct officers must be approved by the 
board of county commissioners before such 
bonds can be filed and recorded. All persons 
offered as sureties on official bonds shall 
be examined on oath touching their 
qualifications, and no person, other than a 
surety company, shall be admitted as surety 
on any such bond unless he is a resident and 
free holder within this state and is worth in 
real or personal property, or both, situate 
in this state the amount of his undertaking 
over and above all just debts and liabilities 
exclusive of property exempt from execution. 
All official bonds shall be recorded in the 
office of the county recorder and then filed 
and kept in the office of the county clerk. 
The official bond of the county clerk after 
being recorded shall be filed and kept in the 
office of the county treasurer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was charged with 
Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987); Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1978); and Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 1-
2). Defendant pled guilty as charged on September 18, 1987, in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R. 79-
86). At the penalty phase, defendant was sentenced to death 
after a jury trial held January 26, 1988 through January 29, 1988 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R. 
299, 354-59). A stay of execution was issued by this Court on 
March 18, 1988. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions 
and sentence in an opinion filed October 13, 1989 in State v. 
Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (S.Ct. October 13, 1989). 
Defendant filed a Petition for Rehearing on December 4, 1989. 
This Court invited the State to answer the Petition for Rehearing 
on December 14, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this Answer, the State relies on the Statement of 
Facts set forth in the Brief of Respondent, No further facts are 
necessary for a determination of the issues now presented to this 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO MANIFEST ERROR RESULTED FROM THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION. 
In his Petition for Rehearing, defendant notes that 
this Court's opinion in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1989) had not been filed at the time the present case was briefed 
and argued. Defendant points out that this Court questioned a 
reasonable doubt instruction in both the Ireland case and in the 
capital use of State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). He 
concludes that Ireland and Tillman are distinguishable from the 
present case because he pled guilty and a reasonable doubt 
instruction was only used in the penalty phase. 
Notably, defendant does not recite the reasonable doubt 
instruction utilized in the present case. Nor does he claim that 
manifest error of a constitutional magnitude resulted in the 
present case. Instead, he simply states that the present case is 
substantially different from Ireland and Tillman. 
This Court has expressed that in a capital case, "this 
Court will review errors raised on appeal, even if no proper 
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based 
on such errors only if they are 'manifest and prejudicial'" 
State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988), aff'd on 
reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (1989); (Citing State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 550 (Utah 1987); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 
(Utah 1983), cert, denied 466 U.S. 942 (1984); State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988 (1982)). 
Assuming that defendant is claiming manifest error, defendant's 
claim should be rejected. 
The relevant jury instruction in the present case reads 
as follows: 
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase 
means a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all of the 
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from your consideration and weighing of 
the totality of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and from the 
evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, 
you can candidly say that you are not 
persuaded that the death penalty should be 
imposed, you have a reasonable doubt. But 
if, after such impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can 
truthfully say that you have been persuaded 
so as to have an abiding conviction that the 
death penalty is appropriate in this case, 
such as you would be willing to act upon in 
the more weighty and important matters 
relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be 
At present, this Court has not enunciated whether a capital 
defendant can raise new issues in a petition for rehearing. In 
any event, the State will respond to defendant's new issues. 
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real, substantial doubt and not one that is 
merely possible or imaginary. 
(R. 266) (See Addendum "A"; Jury Instruction No. 13). 
This court reviewed a similar claim in State v. 
Tillman, 250 P.2d at 571-72. The Tillman instruction read: 
Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the lack of the 
evidence in this case. 
If after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case 
you can candidly say that you are not 
satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have 
reasonable doubt. But if after such 
impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence you can truthfully say that you 
have an abiding conviction of the defendant's 
guilt such as you would be willing to act 
upon in the more weighty and important 
matters relating to your own affairs, you 
have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
must be a real, substantial doubt and not one 
that is merely possible or imaginary. 
Id. at 571-72 (Emphasis in original). In Tillman, a capital 
case, this Court found that the language did not "in any way 
alter the State's burden of proof or shift it to defendant." Id. 
at 572. Thus, no error was assigned to the instruction. 
Subsequently, in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380, 
this court rejected a claim that an instruction almost identical 
to Tillman violated due process. Viewing the Ireland instruction 
in context with other instructions detailing the burden of proof 
and presumption of innocence, this Court ruled that the 
reasonable doubt instruction was not constitutionally defective. 
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In a strong dissent, Justice Stewart took issue with 
the language of the instruction. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380-82 
(Stewart, J. Dissenting). In particular, he expressed that the 
"weighty affairs of life" and "possible or imaginary" language 
was inappropriate. In response to Justice Stewart's concerns, 
the majority opinion acknowledged that the dissent's criticisms 
were justified. As a supervisory matter, this court directed 
that trial courts discontinue use of the inappropriate language 
in reasonable doubt instructions. At the time of the Ireland 
decision, the present case had been briefed, argued, and 
submitted. 
As set forth above, the reasonable doubt instruction in 
the present case was almost identical to the Tillman and Ireland 
instructions. The only distinguishing factor between Tillman and 
the present case is that defendant waived the guilt phase of his 
trial by his plea of guilty. The jury was instructed on the 
reasonable doubt standard only at the penalty phase. In light of 
this Court's determination in Tillman and Ireland, there is no 
compelling reason to find that the reasonable doubt instruction 
constituted manifest error in the penalty phase. The due process 
analysis conducted in Ireland is equally applicable to a penalty 
phase instruction. 
Additionally, this Court in its opinion in the instant 
case conducted a review of the jury instructions to determine 
whether the jury was misled to the conclusion that it could find 
only aggravating circumstances. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
21-22. This Court found that Instructions No's. 12 and 13 
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clearly and correctly enunciate the standards to be applied in a 
capital penalty phase. 3ji. Also, Instruction No. 18 clearly 
states that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the totality of the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the totality of the mitigating 
circumstances and that beyond a reasonable doubt the death 
penalty is appropriate in the circumstances of this case (R. 273) 
(See Addendum "B"; Jury Instruction No. 18). 
Considering the instructions as a whole, it cannot be 
said that the reasonable doubt instruction misled the jury to 
alter or shift the State's burden of proof (R. 279) (See Addendum 
"C"; Jury Instruction No. 23 (Instructing the jury "to consider 
all the instructions as a whole.")). Consequently, this Court 
should find that the instruction did not constitute manifest and 
prejudicial error. 
POINT II 
IN THE ABSENCE OF RECORD SUPPORT, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT MANIFEST 
ERROR RESULTED BY THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXECUTE A SURETY BOND 
PRIOR TO TAKING POLITICAL OFFICE. 
On rehearing, defendant raises the claim that the Iron 
County Attorney failed to execute an official bond before 
entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (L987 replacement) (See 
Addendum "D"; Statute). He claims that without a surety bond, 
the County Attorney could not sign the information charging 
defendant's crime. He concludes that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction without a valid information. Defendant's claim 
should be rejected. 
As stated earlier, this Court will review an 
unpreserved claim in capital cases but will reverse only if it is 
"manifest and prejudicial." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254. 
It is axiomatic, however, that with "no claim of prejudice and 
nothing in the record to substantiate any harm or error, [this 
Court] can only conclude that [a] defendant's claim of 
irregularity is without merit." State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 24. 
In the instant case, there is no record support for 
defendant's claim that the Iron County Attorney failed to execute 
an official bond. Neither is there record evidence of any 
prejudice that could have resulted from such a collateral and 
insubstantial failure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded). In the 
absence of record support for defendant's claim of error and 
prejudice, this Court should conclude that defendant's claim is 
without merit. 
DATED thLsc^O——day of December, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Respondent's Answer to Petition for Rehearing, was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to James L. Shumate, attorney for 
appellant, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this ^ 
of January, 1990. 
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_i n_ 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /3 
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase means a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all of the 
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from your consideration and weighing of the 
totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and 
from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you are not 
persuaded that the death penalty should be imposed, you have a 
reasonable doubt. But if, after such impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you 
have been persuaded so as to have an abiding conviction that the 
death penalty is appropriate in this case, such as you would be 
willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters 
relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt must be real, substantial doubt and not one that 
is merely possible or imaginary. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO._/S 
I have previously instructed you that the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of 
the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances in this case and that, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the imposition of the death penalty is justified and 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. You must find that 
the State has met its burden before you may impose the death 
penalty in this case. 
As an aggravating cixcumstance in addition to those upon 
which I have previously instructed you, the State has produced 
evidence that the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, committed 
the crime of being a person on parole in possession of a firearm 
in violation of the law of this State. Before you may consider 
evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm before, during or 
after he admittedly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest, you 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt, that each and every one of 
the following elements has been proven by the evidence: 
1. That the offense, if any, occurred in the State of Utah, 
2. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about August 
31, 1987, although the exact date is immaterial, 
3. That the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parosn, was on 
parole for a felony, 
i*73 
4. That the defendant, knowingly had in his possession or 
under his custody or control, 
5. A firearm. 
You are instructed that the »38 caliber pistol located in 
the glove compartment of the 1906 Dodge Omni is in fact a firearm. 
If you find that each and every element stated has been 
proven by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
may consider the possession of the firearm by the defendant as 
an aggravating circumstance. 
If you find that one or more of these elements has not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may not consider the 
presence of the firearm in the vehicle for any purpose and you 
are hereby instructed, in that case, to ignore and disregard the 
evidence presented regarding the firearm. 
A special verdict question will be given so you can 
state you findings on this question. 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO, £3 
If in these Instructions any rule, direction or idea be 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and 
none should be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to 
single out any certain sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole and are to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
ADDENDUM D 
17-16-11. Official bonds. 
The board of county commissioners shall prescribe by ordinance the amount 
in which the following county and precinct officers shall execute official bonds 
before entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective offices, viz.: 
county clerk, county auditor, sheriff, county attorney, county recorder, county 
assessor, county surveyor, justice of the peace and constable, and the board 
may by ordinance require any deputy or assistant of any such officer to exe-
cute an official bond before entering upon the discharge of the duties of his 
office. The amount in which the county treasurer shall execute an official 
bond shall be prescribed by the state money management council. If surety 
company bonds are taken, the premium for such of the bonds as the county 
commissioners shall specify by ordinance shall be paid out of the county funds. 
The judge or judges of the district court of the county shall prescribe the 
amount in which each member of the board of county commissioners of the 
county shall execute an official bond before entering upon the discharge of the 
duties of his office. If surety company bonds are taken and if the coimty 
commissioners shall so direct by ordinance the premium for each such bond 
shall be paid out of the county funds. The bonds and sureties of county com-
missioners must, before the bonds can be recorded and filed, be approved by 
one of said judges. The bonds and sureties of all other county and precinct 
officers must be approved by the board of county commissioners before such 
bonds can be filed and recorded. All persons offered as sureties on official 
bonds shall be examined on oath touching their qualifications, and no person, 
other than a surety company, shall be admitted as surety on any such bond 
unless he is a resident and freeholder within this state and is worth in real or 
personal property, or both, situate in this state the amount of his undertaking 
over and above all just debts and liabilities exclusive of property exempt from 
406 
